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SELL V. UNITED STATES: INVOLUNTARY
ADMINISTRATION OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION
TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to bodily integrity and the right to refuse medical
treatment are well recognized in America.1 These rights protect a
person's ability to control what is done to his body. "Our legal sys-
tem is premised upon a principle of autonomy for individuals,
particularly in making decisions which principally affect their
own lives."2 Based on the recognition of personal autonomy in
Washington v. Harper,3 the Supreme Court held that a substan-
tive due process interest exists in refusing unwanted antipsy-
chotic medication4 when a prison inmate poses a proven danger to
himself or to others.5 In Riggins v. Nevada,6 however, the Court
indicated that the constitutionality of forcibly medicating a non-
dangerous defendant to promote other governmental interests
remained unsettled.7
Recently, in Sell v. United States,8 the Court resolved the issue
by holding that the government may in certain circumstances
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill criminal
1. See Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Pro-
cedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 836 (2003); David M.
Siegel et al., Old Law Meets New Medicine: Revisiting Involuntary Psychotropic Medica-
tion of the Criminal Defendant, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 307, 325 (2001).
2. Siegel et al., supra note 1, at 357.
3. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
4. See id. at 221-22. Antipsychotic drugs are typically grouped under the broader
category of psychotropic drugs. See Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives:
Having One's Say?, 89 KY. L.J. 327, 332 n.23 (2001). Psychotropic drugs are "pharmacol-
ogical agents used to treat psychiatric disorders." Id. (quoting 2 KAPLAN AND SADOCK'S
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2241 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sa-
dock eds., 7th ed. 2000)).
5. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
6. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
7. See id. at 136.
8. 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003).
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defendant to render him competent to stand trial for serious
crimes.9 Part II of this note discusses the legal competence stan-
dard and the effect involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs has on this standard. Part III discusses the background of
Sell and analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV
examines potential impacts of the Sell decision on criminal law.
II. LEGAL COMPETENCE AND INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION
While the issue of whether a criminal defendant is competent
to stand trial is purely a legal question, the issue is not resolved
by consulting the law.' ° Instead, a court must rely on the results
of a mental competence assessment performed by a mental health
professional to decide if the criminal defendant is competent to
stand trial." "[A] criminal defendant must be mentally competent
at all stages of the proceedings," 2 thus requiring the defendant to
demonstrate "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceed-
ings against him." 3
If a court finds the defendant incompetent, "he is typically sent
to a ... mental hospital to be 'restored' to competency." 4 Most de-
fendants found to be incompetent suffer from some type of delu-
sional disorder, usually treated with antipsychotic medications to
suppress symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions.'" Ordi-
narily, "when a person is 'civilly committed' to a mental health fa-
9. See id. at 2178.
10. See Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of
Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 348-49 (1996).
11. See id. Mental health professionals focus on various criteria-the most common of
which are cognitive. See id. at 349. The four cognitive factors of the competence standard
are: "(i) ability to communicate a choice, (ii) ability to understand relevant information,
(iii) ability to appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences, and (iv)
ability to manipulate information rationally." Id. at 351.
12. Elaine Cassel, Medicating the Mentally Ill for Trial and Execution: What Are the
Implications of the Supreme Court's Recent Decision?, at httpJ/writ.news.findlaw.com/ cas-
sel/20030703.html (Mar. 29, 2004); Dunlap, supra note 4, at 365.
13. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
14. Cassel, supra note 12.
15. Id. Antipsychotic drugs "alter the chemical balance in a patient's brain, leading to
changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes." Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
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cility, he... cannot be medicated against his ... will unless nec-
essary to keep him from harming himself or others."16 Following
the Sell decision, defendants facing criminal charges may now be
forced to take antipsychotic medication solely to render them
competent to stand trial.
17
The administration of antipsychotic medication is considered
voluntary if the medication is administered with the defendant's
informed consent. In Weiss v. Missouri Department of Mental
Health,'" the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri held that employees of a mental hospital may admin-
ister an antipsychotic drug to a patient with the patient's in-
formed consent.19 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Benson v. Terhune° held that where a defendant
accepts or fails to refuse the administration of antipsychotic
medication without information about the drugs, there is no
forced administration of the drugs.2 The court stated that al-
though jail is a coercive setting, a prisoner is not presumed to be
coerced.22 Furthermore, situations may exist where the medica-
tion might render the prisoner incapable of refusing further
treatment.23 These circumstances require judicial review of the
specific facts of the case.24
Administration of antipsychotic medication is considered invol-
untary once a court denies a defendant's motion to terminate it.
The Supreme Court in Riggins v. Nevada2' held that once a de-
fendant moves to terminate the administration of antipsychotic
medication during a trial, the act of forcibly administering antip-
sychotic medication becomes involuntary. 26 Therefore, the state
becomes obligated to establish the need for the drug and the
16. Cassel, supra note 12. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Court de-
fined civil commitment as "a civil proceeding brought under state law to commit an indi-
vidual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital." Id. at 419-20.
17. See Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2184-85 (2003).
18. 587 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
19. See id. at 1161. Interestingly, the defendant in Weiss voluntarily took the drug
without being advised of its potential side effects. Id.
20. 304 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002).
21. See id. at 884-85.
22. See id. at 882.
23. See id. at 885.
24. See id. at 882.
25. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
26. See id. at 133.
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medical appropriateness of the drug." In Sell v. United States,
the Court expanded the Riggins analysis into a four-part test
used to determine when antipsychotic drugs can be administered
involuntarily to criminal defendants.2"
III. SELL V. UNITED STATES
A. Background
In May 1997, Dr. Charles Sell, D.D.S., was charged in a federal
criminal complaint with submitting fictitious insurance claims for
payment.29 The government filed a motion to compel a psychiatric
examination of Sell to determine his competence to stand trial.3"
The court ordered that Sell be sent to the United States Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners ("Medical Center") for a psychiatric
evaluation.31 After Sell's psychiatric evaluation, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found Sell
competent to stand trial, but noted "that there was a possibility
that [Sell] would develop a psychotic episode in the future."32 The
grand jury indicted Sell on fifty-six counts of mail fraud, six
counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money laundering.33 In
August 1997, Sell was released on bond.34
The United States filed a bond revocation petition alleging that
Sell had violated the conditions of his release by intimidating a
witness in January 1998."5 At the bail revocation hearing, Sell's
behavior was "out of control."36 "He screamed, shouted, and used
27. See id. at 135.
28. See 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2184-85 (2003).
29. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 2002). The government alleged
that "Sell and his wife submitted false claims to Medicaid and private insurance compa-
nies for dental services not provided." Id.
30. Id. Sell has a long history of mental illness. In September 1982, Sell was hospital-
ized for the first time. See 123 S. Ct. at 2179 (2003). Then in June 1984, Sell was hospital-
ized again. Id.
31. 282 F.3d at 562.
32. Id. at 562-63.
33. Id. at 563.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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racial epithets." 7 Consequently, "the court ordered that Sell's
bond be revoked and that he be detained."" Then, in April 1998, a
second indictment was issued charging Sell with attempting to
murder both the FBI agent who had arrested him and a former
employee who planned to testify against him in the fraud case."9
In February 1999, Sell filed a motion asking the court to recon-
sider whether he was competent to stand trial.4" The court found
that Sell suffered from a mental disease, which rendered him in-
competent for trial.41 Therefore, Sell was ordered to return to the
Medical Center to determine whether he could "attain the capac-
ity to stand trial."
42
The Medical Center staff sought permission from institutional
authorities to administer antipsychotic drugs to Sell involuntar-
ily.4 ' At an administrative hearing," before a medical hearing of-
ficer, the staff testified that using antipsychotic medication was
the only way Sell could be restored to competency.45 However, Sell
testified that he did not wish to take the medication. 46 The hear-
ing officer authorized involuntary administrations of antipsy-
chotic drugs, stating that Sell's "delusional thinking could make
him dangerous and that no other drug could treat his delusional
symptoms."4 ' The Medical Center then reviewed the finding of the
medical hearing officer and concluded that antipsychotic medica-
37. Id. When Sell was advised of his rights, he leaned towards the judge and spit in
her face. Id.
38. Id. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from a psychiatrist that Sell could
soon become a danger to himself and others. Id.
39. Id. The attempted murder and fraud cases were joined for trial. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. "The court ordered that Sell be hospitalized.., for a reasonable period of time
not to exceed four months...." Id.
43. See id. at 563-64.
44. 28 C.F.R. § 549.43 provides the standards and procedures used to determine
whether a person in custody may be involuntarily medicated. See 28 C.F.R. § 549.43
(2003). Before an individual can be medicated, a psychiatrist must determine whether
medication "is necessary in order to attempt to make the inmate competent for trial or is
necessary because the inmate is dangerous to self or others, is gravely disabled, or is un-
able to function in the open population of a mental health referral center or a regular
prison." 28 C.F.R. § 549.43(a)(5).
45. 282 F.3d at 564.
46. Id.
47. Id.
2004]
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tion represented the treatment "most likely to ameliorate Sell's
symptoms."
48
In July 1999, Sell contested the Medical Center's "right invol-
untarily to administer antipsychotic drugs."49 Medical Center
staff testified that Sell's condition would deteriorate without an-
tipsychotic medication and that the medication was likely to re-
store Sell to competency. ° The magistrate judge, finding that Sell
was a danger to himself and others at the Medical Center, issued
an order authorizing the Medical Center to involuntarily admin-
ister antipsychotic drugs to Sell, but the judge stayed the order to
allow Sell to appeal the issue.51
The district court issued an opinion affirming the magistrate's
order to allow Sell's involuntary medication.52 The court found
that antipsychotic drugs were not only "'medically appropriate'
but also the '"only viable hope of rendering [Sell] competent to
stand trial.'5 3 The court opined that the '[a]dministration of such
drugs appears necessary to serve the government's compelling in-
terest in obtaining an adjudication of defendant's guilt or inno-
cence of numerous and serious charges.'" 4 The district court "re-
versed the magistrate's finding that Sell posed a danger to
himself and others."5 Both parties appealed the district court's
finding. 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's order requiring medication to render
Sell competent to stand trial.5 The court concluded that the "gov-
ernment has an essential interest in bringing a defendant to
trial."8 As the court determined, no less intrusive means existed;
48. Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).
The prison official characterized Sell as a potential risk to the safety of the community. Id.
(citation omitted).
49. Id.
50. 282 F.3d at 564.
51. See Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2180-81; see also United States v. Sell, No. 4:97CR290-DJS,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22425, at *1-3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2000).
52. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2181.
53. Id. (citation omitted).
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d at 565.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 572. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that Sell was not a
danger to himself or others at the Medical Center. See id. at 565.
58. Id. at 568.
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therefore, antipsychotic drug treatment was medically appropri-
ate. 9 The court added that the "medical evidence presented indi-
cated a reasonable probability that Sell [would] fairly be able to
participate in his trial."6 ° Judge Bye dissented, arguing that the
charges against Sell were "not sufficiently serious to forcibly in-
ject him with antipsychotic drugs on the chance it [would] make
him competent to stand trial."61 Sell appealed; the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit." The
determinative question before the Court was whether the gov-
ernment is permitted "to administer antipsychotic drugs involun-
tarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant-in order to render
that defendant competent to stand trial for serious... crimes. ' 3
B. Majority Opinion
1. Jurisdiction
Justice Breyer began the majority opinion64 by examining
whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear Sell's appeal
of the district court's pretrial order.6" Justice Breyer acknowl-
edged that although "[t]he law normally requires a defendant to
wait until the end of the trial to obtain appellate review of a pre-
trial order,"66 federal statutory law67 permits federal appellate
courts to review "final decisions of the district courts.65
59. See id. at 568, 571.
60. Id. at 572.
61. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
62. Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2187 (2003).
63. Id. at 2178.
64. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined
Justice Breyer in delivering the majority opinion. Id.
65. See id. at 2181-82. In analyzing the issue of jurisdiction, Justice Breyer supplied
the factual and procedural background of the order in question:
[The District Court's] judgment affirmed a Magistrate's order requiring Sell
involuntarily to receive medication. The Magistrate entered that order pur-
suant to an earlier delegation from the District Court of legal authority to
conduct pretrial proceedings. The order embodied legal conclusions related to
the Medical Center's administrative efforts to medicate Sell; these efforts
grew out of Sell's provisional commitment; and that provisional commitment
took place pursuant to an earlier Magistrate's order seeking a medical de-
termination about Sell's future competence to stand trial.
Id. at 2187 (citation omitted).
66. Id.
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Sell had not yet been tried for the crimes charged because of
the pretrial issue involving his mental competency. Recognizing
this problematic scenario, the Court pointed out that the law has
created exceptions to the general appellate review rule.69 As Jus-
tice Breyer also noted, "a preliminary or interim decision is ap-
pealable as a 'collateral order' when it (1) 'conclusively deter-
mine[s] the disputed question,' (2) 'resolve[s] an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action,' and (3) is 'ef-
fectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.'"7 °
Justice Breyer concluded that Sell's pretrial order fell within
the collateral order exception.7' First, Justice Breyer explained
that the pretrial order "conclusively determine[d] the disputed
question.., whether Sell ha[d] a legal right to avoid forced medi-
cation."7 2 Secondly, the pretrial order resolved an important is-
sue, since "involuntary medical treatment raises questions of
clear constitutional importance." Justice Breyer also noted that
the issue of whether Sell could be forced to take antipsychotic
medication was separate from the question of whether Sell was
guilty of the crimes charged.74 Lastly, the pretrial order would be
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. After all, "[b]y the
time of trial Sell [would] have undergone forced medication-the
very harm that he [was seeking] to avoid. He [could not] undo
that harm even if he [were] acquitted. Indeed, if he [were] acquit-
ted, there [would] be no appeal through which he might obtain
review."75 Therefore, the pretrial order that Sell appealed was an
appealable collateral order, and the appellate court had jurisdic-
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
68. Id. Justice Breyer defined the term "final decision" as referring to a "final judg-
ment, such as a judgment of guilt, that terminates a criminal proceeding." 123 S. Ct. at
2182.
69. See 123 S. Ct. at 2182.
70. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978)).
71. See id.
72. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
73. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
74. See id. (citation omitted). Additionally, Justice Breyer clarified that the question
presented-whether Sell had a right to avoid forced medication-was different from the
question of whether forced medication made a criminal trial unfair. Id. at 2182-83. "The
first question focuses upon the right to avoid administration of the drugs. What may hap-
pen at trial is relevant, but only as a prediction." Id. at 2183. However, the second ques-
tion asks what actually did happen because the medication was administered. Id.
75. Id. at 2182.
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tion to hear the appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court had ju-
risdiction to decide whether involuntary medication violated
Sell's constitutional rights.76
2. The Constitutional Issue
Once the majority determined that the pretrial order was an
appealable collateral order and the appellate court had proper ju-
risdiction to hear the appeal, the Court addressed the important
question presented: "Does forced administration of antipsychotic
drugs to render Sell competent to stand trial unconstitutionally
deprive him of his 'liberty' to reject medical treatment?"77 The Su-
preme Court determined that the involuntary administration of
drugs to an individual accused of a crime to make him competent
to stand trial does not violate that individual's Fifth Amendment
"liberty" rights as long as it is necessary to "further important
governmental trial-related interests."" The Court determined
that the lower courts had not ordered Sell to involuntarily receive
antipsychotic medication solely to render him competent to stand
trial.79 Consequently, the Court vacated the Eighth Circuit's hold-
ing that Sell was properly medicated."0 The Court relied on two
prior cases to reach this conclusion, Washington v. Harper8 and
Riggins v. Nevada. 2
a. Precedent
In Harper, the Court first recognized that an individual has "a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."83 However, the Court held that "the
76. Id. at 2183.
77. Id. Justice Breyer cited the Fifth Amendment, which states that the government
may not "depriv[e]" any person of "liberty... without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
78. 123 S. Ct. at 2184.
79. See id. at 2187.
80. Id.
81. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
82. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
83. 494 U.S. at 221-22.
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Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate
who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against
his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the
treatment is in the inmate's medical interest."s While the Court
recognized that the defendant had a significant liberty interest in
precluding any involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs,"5 the Court determined that the state's interest was le-
gitimate in light of "the danger that an inmate suffering from a
serious mental disorder represents to himself or others."s6
Two years later, in Riggins, the Court reiterated that "forcing
antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible ab-
sent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of
medical appropriateness. "s8 The Court suggested that an overrid-
ing justification for involuntary administration of drugs exists
when "treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential
for the sake of [the defendant's] own safety or the safety of oth-
ers."
88
The Sell Court stated that these two cases
indicate that the Constitution permits the Government involuntarily
to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent
to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the
fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alterna-
tives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental
trial-related interests.8
9
The Court enumerated a four-part test, which will allow involun-
tary medication only in instances where all four of the factors are
fulfilled."
84. Id. at 227.
85. Id. at 221.
86. Id. at 236.
87. 504 U.S. at 135.
88. Id.
89. Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2003) (emphasis added).
90. See id. at 2184-85.
1056 [Vol. 38:1047
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b. The Resulting Sell Test
First, the involuntary administration of medication to a defen-
dant must further an important governmental interest.91 The
government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of
committing a serious crime is considered an important interest.92
In Illinois v. Allen,9" Justice Brennan stated that the "[c]onstitu-
tional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a
scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and
peace." 4 However, Justice Breyer in Sell concluded that courts
"must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the
Government's interest in prosecution. Special circumstances may
lessen the importance of that interest."5 For example, if the de-
fendant refuses to take antipsychotic medication voluntarily, then
he may be confined to a mental institution.96 Being institutional-
ized "diminish[es] the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing with-
out punishment one who has committed a serious crime." 7 The
Court recognized that the government has a "substantial interest
in timely prosecution."9" However, this interest is weakened when
the defendant regains mental competency after years of being in-
stitutionalized 99 or when the defendant has "been confined for a
significant amount of time," receiving credit toward any sentence
imposed.100
Second, a court must conclude that involuntary medication will
"significantly further" these important governmental interests. 1'
The administration of antipsychotic drugs must be found "sub-
stantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial."10 2 Additionally, the administration of the medication must
be found "substantially unlikely to have side effects that will in-
91. See id. at 2184.
92. Id.
93. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
94. Id. at 347 (Brennan, J., concurring).
95. 123 S. Ct. at 2184.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. The Court remarked that during commitment, "memories may fade and
evidence may be lost," making it "difficult or impossible" to try the defendant. Id.
100. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2000) (outlining the guidelines for receiving credit
for prior custody).
101. 123 S. Ct. at 2184.
102. Id.
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terfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel
in conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial un-
fair."'0 3 In Riggins, Justice Kennedy stated that antipsychotic
drugs "can prejudice the accused in two principal ways: (1) by al-
tering his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice his reactions
and presentation in the courtroom, and (2) by rendering him un-
able or unwilling to assist counsel."" 4 Furthermore, Justice Ken-
nedy noted that in every case, the state must show that "there is
no significant risk that the medication will impair or alter in any
material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to
the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel."0 5
Third, a court must conclude that involuntary medication is
necessary to further the governmental interests.0 6 This requires
the trial court to consider any alternative, less intrusive, form of
treatment.0 7 A court must also find that such alternative treat-
ment is "unlikely to achieve substantially the same results" as
antipsychotic medication.' If the court concludes that antipsy-
chotic medication is necessary to further the important govern-
mental interests, then it must consider less intrusive means for
administering the drugs.0 9
Finally, a court must decide that the administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs is "medically appropriate" or in the patient's best
medical interest."0 This requirement ensures that the defendant
is not harmed by medication intended to improve his mental
state. The side effects caused by each type of antipsychotic drug
are important in this analysis as is the level of success of each
drug."'
103. Id. at 2184-85.
104. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In United
States v. Santonio, No. 2:00-CR-90C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5892 (C.D. Utah May 4, 2001),
the court held that the defendant could not be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic medi-
cation and that antipsychotic drugs might create a negative demeanor in a defendant that
could be prejudicial. See id. at *14-16. The court considered that the medication might
cause the defendant to appear nervous, bored, or unfeeling. Id. at *15. The medication
could also diminish the defendant's ability to communicate with counsel or to the jury,
thereby limiting the defendant's ability to fully participate in his own defense. Id.
105. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. 123 S. Ct. at 2185.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
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c. Involuntary Medication May Be Justified on Other Grounds
The Court emphasized that applying the four-part test only de-
termines "whether involuntary administration of drugs is neces-
sary significantly to further a particular governmental interest,
namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent to
stand trial.""2 Involuntary medication may be warranted for dif-
ferent purposes, such as the dangerousness of the defendant or
the health of the defendant.1 3 In Harper, the Court stated that
"[wihere an inmate's mental disability is the root cause of the
threat he poses to the inmate population, the State's interest in
decreasing the danger to others necessarily encompasses an in-
terest in providing him with medical treatment for his illness."'
Consequently, the drugs are being administered for the sole pur-
pose of medical treatment.
Justice Breyer advised lower courts to first consider these al-
ternative grounds before turning to the trial competence ques-
tion.' The analysis for whether medication is permissible to
make the accused nondangerous is "both objective and manage-
able." '16 Justice Breyer suggested that medical personnel may
find it easier to provide an opinion about whether antipsychotic
drugs are necessary to control the defendant's dangerous behav-
ior than to render an opinion that the drugs are necessary to
make the defendant legally competent to stand trial.' 7 If a court
authorizes medication on these alternative grounds, there is no
need to consider the trial competence issue.'18 Alternatively, if the
court finds that medication is not authorized on these alternative
grounds, the findings underlying its decision will help to decide
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225-26 (1990).
115. See 123 S. Ct. at 2185.
116. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117. See 123 S. Ct. at 2185; see also United States v. Kourey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 580, 580-
81 (2003) (finding that grounds existed for involuntarily administering antipsychotic medi-
cation to the defendant because he was "'gravely disabled' by his mental condition and
pose[d] a danger to himself").
118. See 123 S. Ct. at 2185-86; see also In re Robert S., 792 N.E.2d 421, 436-37 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003) (determining the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to be ap-
propriate without considering the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand
trial).
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the trial competence issue.119 Justice Breyer suggested that lower
courts focus on questions such as:
Why is it medically appropriate forcibly to administer antipsychotic
drugs to an individual who (1) is not dangerous and (2) is competent
to make up his own mind about treatment? Can bringing such an in-
dividual to trial alone justify... administration of a drug that may
have adverse side effects, including side effects that may to some ex-
tent impair a defense at trial? 2 °
Accordingly, the trial competence issue should then be easier for
a court to decide.
d. Majority's Conclusion
The majority concluded that the Medical Center and the magis-
trate approved involuntary medication based primarily upon
Sell's dangerousness to others. 21 However, both the district court
and the court of appeals disagreed with the magistrate's conclu-
sion regarding Sell's dangerousness and authorized involuntary
medication in order to render Sell competent to stand trial. 22 Be-
grudgingly accepting the determination below that Sell was not
dangerous, 23 Justice Breyer vacated the Eighth Circuit's holding
that Sell was properly medicated. 124 Specifically, Justice Breyer
noted that the magistrate had not approved involuntary medica-
tion on "trial competence grounds alone,1"25 expert witnesses had
failed to "focus upon trial competence, " 126 and "the lower courts
did not consider that Sell ha[d] already been confined.., for a
long period of time, and that his refusal to take antipsychotic
drugs might result in further lengthy confinement." 127
119. See 123 S. Ct. at 2186.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. Justice Breyer accepted that Sell was not dangerous "only because the
Government did not contest, and the parties [did] not argueO, that particular matter. If
anything, the record... suggest [ed] the contrary." Id.
124. Id. at 2187.
125. Id.
126. Id. The Court explained that, as a consequence, "the experts did not pose impor-
tant questions-questions, for example, about trial-related side effects and risks-the an-
swers to which could have helped determine whether forced medication was warranted on
trial competence grounds alone." Id.
127. Id. Sell's time served would count as credit toward a future sentence, see 18 U.S.C.
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C. Dissenting Opinion
1. Lack of Final Judgment
Justice Scalia authored the dissenting opinion and was joined
by Justices O'Connor and Thomas. The dissent argued that the
district court never entered a final judgment in the case. 2 ' The
court of appeals, the dissent argued, should have asked "whether
it had any business entertaining [Sell's] appeal," 129 and Justice
Scalia attributed the failure to consider the jurisdiction question
to the United States' refusal to contest the issue. 130 Justice Scalia
concluded that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case and advocated vacating the appellate court's decision.
131
2. Appeal of the Administrative Hearing
As an initial matter, Justice Scalia criticized Sell for not ap-
pealing the administrative hearing, which authorized involuntary
medication. 32 Sell could have obtained a review of the adminis-
trative hearing by filing suit under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 33 or by filing a Bivens34 action.'35 Either suit would have
provided Sell with immediate appellate review of the administra-
tive hearing decision. 36 Instead of appealing the result of the ad-
§ 3585(b) (2000), whereas further confinement even without medication could weaken "the
importance of the governmental interest." 123 S. Ct. at 2187.
128. See, 123 S. Ct. at 2187 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 2188 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court's cases do not authorize appeal from
the District Court's April 4, 2001, order, which was neither a 'final decision' under § 1291
nor part of the class of specified interlocutory orders in § 1292.").
132. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Sell did request an administrative appeal pursuant
to 28 C.F.R. § 549.43(a)(6) (2003), which provides: "The inmate... may submit an appeal
to the institution mental health division administrator regarding the decision within 24
hours of the decision." See id. at 2188 n.2 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 549.43(a)(6) (2003)).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
134. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
135. 123 S. Ct. at 2191 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A Bivens action is "available to federal
pretrial detainees challenging the conditions of their confinement." Id. (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). For additional discussion of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning Bivens,
see Matthew G. Mazefsky, Note, Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko: Unmask-
ing the Implied Damage Remedy, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 639, 639-62 (2003).
136. See 123 S. Ct. at 2191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ministrative hearing to federal court, Sell requested a hearing re-
garding the right to refuse antipsychotic medication in the dis-
trict court where his criminal charges were pending.137 The pre-
trial order, which resulted from the hearing Sell requested, is the
same order appealed to the Supreme Court.38 Since Sell chose "to
challenge his forced medication in the context of a criminal trial,
he must abide by the limitations attached to such a challenge-
which [would] prevent him from stopping the proceedings in their
tracks.' 39 Justice Scalia concluded that Sell's "mistaken litigation
strategy, and [the majority's] desire to decide an interesting con-
stitutional issue, [did] not justify a disregard of the limits that
Congress has imposed on courts of appeals'.., jurisdiction."4 °
3. Collateral Order Exception
The dissent did recognize the collateral order exception to the
final judgment rule, but not as broadly as the majority. Justice
Scalia identified the collateral order exception as a "narrow ex-
ception" invented by the Supreme Court."' Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the pretrial order in dispute did not satisfy the third
requirement of the collateral order exception.'
Relying on Riggins v. Nevada, Justice Scalia concluded that the
pretrial order would only be reviewable on appeal from conviction
and sentence. 43 In Riggins, the defendant was involuntarily
medicated while being institutionalized before his criminal
trial."M On appeal from his murder conviction, Riggins argued
137. See id. at 2188 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that "[i]t is not apparent why
this order was necessary, since the Government had already received authorization to
medicate [Sell] pursuant to [the administrative hearing]." Id. at 2188 n.3 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia argued that if the district court had not entered the pretrial order,
the administrative hearing decision ordering Sell to take antipsychotic medication would
remain in effect. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 2189 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted "I use the term 'in-
vented' advisedly. The statutory test provides no basis." Id. at 2189 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
142. Id. at 2189. The third requirement of the collateral order exception is that the or-
der must be unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)).
143. See 123 S. Ct. at 2189 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133.
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that the government had violated the "full and fair" trial stan-
dard set forth in Harper.'45 The Riggins Court held that involun-
tary medication of a criminal defendant that violates the Harper
test entitles the defendant to a reversal of his criminal convic-
tions. 146 Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that the majority was
wrong to say Sell's pretrial order fell within the collateral order
exception.147 Justice Scalia recognized that if Sell "must wait until
final judgment to appeal, he will not receive the type of remedy he
would prefer-a predeprivation injunction rather than the post-
deprivation vacatur of conviction provided by Riggins."4 ' How-
ever, the defendant's preference of the type of remedy has been
rejected by several Supreme Court cases. '49
Justice Scalia criticized the majority for not interpreting the
collateral order exception "'with the utmost strictness."" 0 As Jus-
tice Scalia explained: "In the 54 years since we invented the ex-
ception, we have found only three types of prejudgment orders in
criminal cases appealable: denials of motions to reduce bail, deni-
als of motions to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds, and denials
of motions to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause."15
Sell's pretrial order does not involve any of the recognized excep-
tions, thus, the dissent argued, the collateral order exception did
not apply.
Justice Scalia speculated as to what the four-part Sell test
could be extended to permit:
A trial-court order requiring the defendant to wear an electronic
bracelet could be attacked as an immediate infringement of the con-
stitutional right to "bodily integrity"; an order refusing to allow the
defendant to wear a T-shirt that says "Black Power" in front of the
145. See id.
146. See id. at 135-38.
147. See 123 S. Ct. at 2189 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, the Court cited: Flanagan v. United
States, 465 U.S. 259, 270 (1984) (disallowing an appeal of an order disqualifying defense
counsel); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 270 (1982) (disallowing
an appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds of prosecuto-
rial vindictiveness); and Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 414-15 (1957) (disallowing
an appeal of an order denying a motion to suppress evidence).
150. 123 S. Ct. at 2189 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v.
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (citation omitted)).
151. Id. at 2189-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia considered
the collateral order exception to have been created in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See 123 S. Ct. at 2190-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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jury could be attacked as an immediate violation of First Amend-
ment rights; and an order compelling testimony could be attacked as
an immediate denial [sic] Fifth Amendment rights.
152
Under the Sell holding, each of these scenarios would be immedi-
ately appealable. Thus, the dissent concluded that prior Supreme
Court cases, such as Flanagan v. United States"3 and Carroll v.
United States 54-which held that orders that may infringe upon
a defendant's constitutionally-protected rights had to wait under
final judgment-were "seemingly overruled" by the Sell hold-
ing. 15 The dissent concluded that the Court's holding revises the
collateral order exception test set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial In-
dustrial Loan Corp.' 6 "to dispense with the third requirement
(unreviewable on appeal) only when the important separate issue
in question involves a 'severe intrusion' and hence an 'important
constitutional issue.""57
IV. THE OVERLOOKED IMPLICATIONS OF SELL
While the Supreme Court established a four-part test in Sell to
determine when antipsychotic medication may be involuntarily
administered,5 8 lower courts are struggling to apply the test due
primarily to the Court's failure to clearly define essential terms.
Assuming a court finds that all four parts of the test are satisfied,
antipsychotic drugs will then be involuntarily administered to the
criminal defendant.' 59 However, the Sell Court neglected to con-
sider the dangerous side effects common to many antipsychotic
drugs, as well as the detrimental consequences involuntary ad-
ministration of antipsychotic medication will have on the criminal
justice system as a whole.
152. 123 S. Ct. at 2190 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
154. 354 U.S. 394 (1957).
155. See 123 S. Ct. at 2190 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
157. 123 S. Ct. at 2191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2184-85.
159. See id.
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A. Applying the Sell Analysis
1. Definition of a Serious Crime
The Sell test only applies to criminal defendants charged with
committing serious crimes.16 However, the Court did not provide
a definition of a serious crime. Justice Breyer did, however, state
that a crime is serious "whether the offense is a serious crime
against the person or a serious crime against property." 6 ' In
United States v. Kourey, 6 2 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia found that the defendant
was not facing serious criminal charges since the defendant was
charged with violating the terms of his supervised release im-
posed for the commission of a Class A misdemeanor. 6 3 Attempt-
ing to apply the Sell analysis, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia in United States v. Evans"
adopted the definition of a serious crime used in the context of the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.165 "[T]he Court has defined
serious offenses for purposes of determining the right to trial by
jury as those offenses for which a term of imprisonment exceeding
six months may be imposed."'66 Likewise, the Evans court con-
cluded that the defendant was charged with a serious crime since
the maximum penalty was up to one year of imprisonment. 167
2. Interpreting "Special Circumstances"
The Sell Court recognized that "[s]pecial circumstances may
lessen the importance" of the government's interest in prosecut-
ing the defendant. 6 For example, the defendant's refusal to take
160. See id. at 2184.
161. Id.
162. 276 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D. W.Va. 2003).
163. Id. at 585.
164. No. 1:02CR00136, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21570 (W.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2003).
165. Id. at *14.
166. Id. at *14--15.
167. Id. at *16.
168. Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2003).
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antipsychotic drugs may result in further institutionalization.169
Being institutionalized "diminish[es] the risks that ordinarily at-
tach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a se-
rious crime."17°
The Court also recognized that the government has a "substan-
tial interest in timely prosecution." 7' However, in United States
v. Miller,'72 the United States District Court for the District of
Maine found that the government had not shown that a delay in
the prosecution of the defendant would prejudice the government
to fairly enforce the law.173 The Court opined that "[tihere [was]
no showing that the memories of witnesses [were] fading or that
witnesses [were], or [were] likely to become, unavailable for a
trial when it [was] reached without forcibly medicating the De-
fendant. " 174 Consequently, the court denied the government's mo-
tion to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to the defendant.
7 5
B. The Side Effects of Antipsychotic Medication
1. Boredom and Unresponsiveness
The American Psychological Association ("APA") noted as
amicus curiae, that antipsychotic medication "operate[s] on the
individual's thought processes, and thus implicate [s] fundamental
issues of personhood and individuality."1 76 Furthermore, antipsy-
chotic drugs physically infiltrate the defendant's body and change
the biochemical makeup of the body, making the defendant ap-
pear bored or restless, which "can prejudice the defendant in the
eyes of the jury." 7 Justice Kennedy recognized the hazard in
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 292 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Me. 2003).
173. See id. at 164-65.
174. Id. at 165.
175. Id.
176. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at *8, Sell v. United
States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664), available at 2002 WL 31898300 [hereinafter
APA Brief].
177. Id. at *5.
1066 [Vol. 38:1047
SELL V. UNITED STATES
Riggins that the defendant may "appear unsympathetic to the
jury or even the judge."'78 Justice Kennedy concluded that these
drugs might make the defendant "'so calm or sedated as to appear
bored, cold, unfeeling, and unresponsive.' 179 Other common side
effects of antipsychotic drugs include blurred vision, dry mouth
and throat, and dizziness.'
The APA warned that these side effects may be overlooked by
mental health professionals.' 8 ' Therefore, a court must consider
the side effects of antipsychotic drugs and the effects the drugs
have on the jury's evaluation of the defendant. Fortunately, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut recognized the trial rights of the
defendant in State v. Jacobs'8 ' and remanded the case to the ap-
pellate court for an evaluation of the effects of forcible admini-
stration of antipsychotic drugs on the defendant's right to a fair
trial."8 3 The APA suggested that newly developed drugs,'" which
have a lower risk of side effects,' 5 need to be considered by a
court instead of only the traditional antipsychotic drugs.'
8 6
2. Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome
Antipsychotic drugs can also cause neuroleptic malignant syn-
drome."8 7 This disease can cause high fevers, labile blood pres-
sure, rapid heartbeat, profuse sweating, shortness of breath,
coma, and even death." s The mortality rate of neuroleptic malig-
178. Seeid. at*10.
179. Id. (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 143 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted)).
180. See id. at *21.
181. Id. at *10. "[C]ertain health-care professionals have a well-documented tendency
to overprescribe drugs and disregard other, less intrusive modalities of treatment that
may also be beneficial." Id. at *11.
182. 828 A.2d 587 (Conn. 2003).
183. Id. at 589.
184. The newly developed drugs are known as "second-generation antipsychotic drugs."
APA Brief, supra note 176, at *4.
185. Common side effects of second-generation antipsychotic drugs include seizures,
hypotension, and weight gain. Id. at *23.
186. See id. at *4.
187. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc.
at *11, United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1862EMSL), available at
2001 WL 34091094.
188. Id.
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nant syndrome is twenty percent.1 8 9 In Harper, the Court stated
that "[fiorced administration of antipsychotic medication may not
be used as a form of punishment."190 However, administering
medication that carries a substantial risk of death is an obvious
form of punishment left unconsidered by the Sell Court.
C. Detrimental Consequences of the Sell Holding
1. Defendants Who Remain Incompetent
The Court did not consider criminal defendants who fail to re-
gain competence after long periods of time. Medication initially
considered medically appropriate might not be when later shown
to be ineffective. Elaine Cassel, a legal scholar, suggested that
"[in the end, civil commitment must be the answer for a defen-
dant who cannot, even when forcibly drugged, become competent
enough to stand trial."' 9 ' Additionally, the APA noted that
"[mlany mental disorders that bear some resemblance to one an-
other respond very differently to medication."'92 While antipsy-
chotic drugs are often effective in alleviating the psychotic symp-
toms of mental disorders, not all persons with mental disorders
respond positively to such drugs.'93 A court must feel confident
that the defendant has been correctly diagnosed before ordering
the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs.' If the
defendant is ordered to take antipsychotic drugs, the court should
review the order to ensure the defendant is successfully respond-
ing to the drugs.
2. Impairing the Defendant's Ability to Present an Effective
Defense
Antipsychotic drugs may suppress psychotic symptoms to the
point that the defendant's ability to raise an effective insanity de-
189. Id. Death usually occurs soon after beginning the medication "often due to renal
failure, arrhythmias, pulmonary emboli, or aspiration pneumonia." Id.
190. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 241 (1990).
191. Cassel, supra note 12.
192. APA Brief, supra note 176, at *4.
193. See id. at *15-16.
194. See generally id. at *16-17 (comparing a diagnosis of delusional disorder with a
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia).
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fense is impaired.1"5 While the defendant can introduce testimony
of therapists who treated him before the administration of antip-
sychotic drugs, it is unlikely to be as effective as the presence of
the pre-medicated defendant. 9 ' "Empirical research shows that
jurors who think the accused is displaying psychotic symptoms at
the time of trial are significantly more likely to return a verdict of
not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder than are
those who think the accused is symptom-free during the trial."'97
Criminal defendants also have the right to present a dimin-
ished capacity defense.' 9 This defense is the defendant's right to
present his own testimony regarding his state of mind at the time
of the alleged crime.'99 The defendant simply introduces evidence
to establish that the requisite mens rea was lacking."' Forcing
the criminal defendant to take antipsychotic medication will pre-
vent him from presenting the evidence necessary to establish an
effective diminished capacity defense. In Faretta v. California,2 °0
the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment protects the
defendant's right to present his own defense.2 °2 "It is the accused,
not counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation,' who must be 'confronted with the witnesses against
him,' and who must be accorded 'compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor."'20 3 The right to present his own defense
belongs directly to the criminal defendant, "for it is he who suf-
fers the consequences if the defense fails."20 4 Consequently, invol-
untary administration of antipsychotic drugs will violate this pro-
tected right, which the Court did not consider in Sell.
195. See id. at *26 n.26 ("[R]endering a previously delusional individual competent may
impair her ability to mount an effective insanity defense by removing the best evidence of
that insanity: the physical manifestations of her own mental state.").
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at
*2, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664), available at 2002 WL
31898312.
199. See id.
200. See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1984).
201. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
202. See id. at 819.
203. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
204. Id. at 820.
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3. The Sell Holding Does Not Promote Judicial Economy
Justice Scalia predicted that the majority's ruling will allow
criminal defendants "to engage in opportunistic behavior."2 °5 Jus-
tice Scalia argued that criminal defendants can now "take their
medication until halfway through trial, then abruptly refuse and
demand an interlocutory appeal from the order that medication
continue on a compulsory basis."2 6 Sell allows criminal defen-
dants to delay the trial for months, claiming appellate review af-
ter final judgment would not prevent a constitutional violation.
The appellate courts are likely to become overwhelmed with in-
terlocutory appeals regarding the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs. Furthermore, an increase in the number of
interlocutory appeals will lengthen the amount of time an appeal
filed after a final judgment has been entered must wait to be
heard.
4. Serving More Time Than Permitted by the Maximum Possible
Punishment
While the government sought to medicate Sell, he spent five
years institutionalized, which included twenty months of solitary
confinement.2 7 In his dissent, Justice Bye of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that Sell's "sentenc-
ing range would be 33-41 months."08 Requiring a defendant to
take antipsychotic medication to find him competent to stand
trial simply adds to the time he will remain institutionalized.
Time served beyond the maximum sentence permitted for the
crimes charged must be viewed as a punishment.0 9 As the Court
205. Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2190 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent warned that if the new rule of law is ap-
plied faithfully, "any criminal defendant who asserts that a trial court order will, if im-
plemented, cause an immediate violation of his constitutional ... rights may immediately
appeal." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc.
and Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund at *16, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct.
2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664), available at 2002 WL 32101073 [hereinafter Eagle Briefl.
208. 282 F.3d 560, 573 (8th Cir. 2002) (Bye, J., dissenting).
209. Eagle Brief, supra note 207, at *16. The government attempts to force medication
into a defendant the government can no longer punish. Id.
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recognized in Harper, "[fiorced administration of antipsychotic
medication may not be used as a form of punishment."2 10
In United States v. Evans, the district court acknowledged that
the defendant's refusal to take antipsychotic drugs would result
in his remaining institutionalized.21 The court concluded that,
"were Evans convicted and sentenced to the maximum term of
imprisonment for the crime charged, he would not serve any addi-
tional term of imprisonment because he would receive credit for
the time he ha[d] remained in custody since his arrest."2 2 Conse-
quently, the court denied the government's request to force the
defendant to take antipsychotic medication. 1 3
V. CONCLUSION
While the Court intended the Sell test to permit involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs in certain rare instances,2 4
the Court left room for evasion. The Sell decision allows a crimi-
nal defendant to appeal an order forcing him to take antipsy-
chotic medication during any stage of the criminal trial. Addi-
tionally, the Court failed to define and clarify key terms
contained in the Sell four-part test. This failure may result in
courts forcing criminal defendants to take antipsychotic drugs
with irreversible harmful side effects before being determined in-
nocent or guilty of the crimes charged. Criminal defendants found
innocent of the crimes charged will have no recourse against the
government due to the nature of the drugs. Thus, it is imperative
that lower courts applying and interpreting the Sell decision do so
with the utmost caution and concern for mentally ill criminal de-
fendants.
Brandy M. Rapp
210. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 241 (1990).
211. No. 1:02CR00136, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21570, at *18 (W.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2003).
212. Id.
213. Id. at *19.
214. Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2003).
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